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This paper sets forth a model-based approach for selecting terms applicable to a 
heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract capable of 
addressing both near- and long-term support considerations over the torpedo life cycle.  
Several performance measures commonly used in PBL contracts are described, and a 
model is presented that is based on an "availability" metric.  This metric is calculated using 
the number of times a required part is not available at field maintenance sites.  The metric is 
computed at the Functional Item Replacement (FIR) or modular level of replacements.  The 
contractor is made responsible for maintaining an inventory of parts on the shelf at the 
maintenance locations.  This is referred to as the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List 
(COSAL), which is not to exceed a negotiated maximum.  Terms of the contract are not 
specified with regard to lead times such as logistical delays and manufacturing and 
restocking lags.  These times are assumed to be under the contractor's control as are 
production quantities, quality, and responsiveness.  A newsvendor approach for determining 
optimal shelf inventory levels is first developed.  An augmented model is evaluated using a 
simulation to determine the performance sensitivity to changes in product quality, demand 
rates, and various supply chain related lead times.  Practical collateral issues such as 
obsolescence, reliability, and cost are also discussed.  This concept is being evaluated as a 
possible go-forward supportability strategy for the MK48 Common Broadband Advanced 
Sonar System (CBASS) Torpedo. 
Keywords: Supportability, Operational Availability, Performance Based Logistics, 
and Torpedo Enterprise. 
Introduction 
The history of modern HWT production and the procurement of associated spares 
can be divided into four major phases starting in the early 1970s.  Each phase was self 
sustaining for that period; however, with a typical torpedo life cycle of 25-40 years and a 
philosophy of upgrading existing inventories versus funding the production of new all-up-
round (AUR) torpedoes, new approaches are needed to address the spares question.  
Current factors that combine to challenge those responsible for the continued maintenance 





implementation of torpedo acquisition reform requirements (starting in 1995), and the need 
to maintain a high state of readiness across the entire inventory at minimal cost. 
The first modern US HWT, the MK 48 Mod 1, entered production in 1972 after an 
intensive “shootout” between competitors.  This first HWT production contract was a sole 
source, high production quantity effort.  It employed a fully documented “build to print” data 
package, which consisted of hundreds of military specifications and standards, as well as 
source/specification control drawings and detailed weapon specification packages.  This 
type of production lasted for over 14 years.  Thousands of torpedoes were produced during 
this period and spares were easy to produce concurrently with production.  Since there was 
a well-documented data package, the Navy Supply System obtained all the spare 
assemblies and parts needed.  This was a technically low risk approach since having proven 
product disclosure documentation essentially eliminated the risk.  During this time period, 
torpedoes were not only produced but several upgrades were implemented and the 
configuration advanced to a MK 48 Mod 4 version. 
As the enemy threat changed during the height of the Cold War with the emergence 
of quieter, faster, and deeper-diving nuclear submarines in the Soviet fleet, the US Navy 
initiated development of a more advanced and capable HWT.  The areas of greatest 
technology improvement included the lowering of torpedo self-noise and the use of 
ruggedized, embedded, digital micro-processors.  The latter capability made it possible for 
digitally controlled torpedoes to be upgraded with new software as threats and 
countermeasures evolved.  The U.S. Navy initiated an advanced torpedo acquisition 
program to capitalize on these improvements and to counter quiet coated threat submarines 
capable of employing sophisticated acoustic countermeasures.  The MK 48 Mod 5 
Advanced Capability (ADCAP) submarine-launched HWT for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
and anti-surface warfare (ASUW) applications was the follow-on to the older MK 48 Mod 3/4.  
The MK 48 Mod 5 ADCAP entered pilot production in 1986.  Production was at the AUR 
level and evolved into a series of dual-source competitive production contracts.  This 
approach sustained the selected contractors by issuing various production quantities to 
each until 1992.  At this time, a winner-take-all production contract was implemented due to 
reduced quantity requirements.  During this time, torpedoes were still procured using a 
build-to-print fully disclosed documentation package in competitive contracts.  As system 
requirements evolved, new torpedo variants were procured.  Again, spares were readily 
available via competition and could be procured by the US Navy Supply system using fully 
documented disclosure packages at low risk.  The ability to procure spares by the US Navy 
Supply system provided significant savings to the program’s logistics/acquisition disciplines.  
Separate funding sources ensured that sufficient spares would be available as the need 
arose.  In the event torpedo spares were not transitioned into the US Navy Supply system 
due to a lack of adequate re-procurement documentation, the spares were procured using 
program funds.  Therefore, it was important that the spares be well documented and 
transitioned into the supply system as soon as possible. 
Starting in 1986 with the Packard Commission Report (1986), “A quest for 
excellence” and continuing into 2002, a number of acquisition reform initiatives were issued 
that changed the way the US Navy and other organizations acquired new systems.  Perry 
(1994) started to shift the focus of the acquisition world from processes to outcomes.  Since 
that time there has been a wholesale embracing of Acquisition Reform (AR) initiatives and 
cancellation of military specifications and standards.  The US Navy torpedo program 
embraced the AR initiative and in 1995 was one of the first to issue a contract under AR 
guidance.  The Torpedo MK 48 Modification Program low rate initial production (LRIP) 





Guidance and Control (G&C) Section and reduced the use of military specifications and 
standards to five.  Detailed weapon specifications were also removed.  The major thrust was 
to replace the proscriptive build-to-print and military specification requirements in the 
ADCAP production technical data package (TDP) with performance specifications and 
appropriate commercial specifications.   The ADCAP propulsion section remained build-to-
print because of its largely mechanical (versus electrical) design, maintenance/replacement 
complexities, and the effort required to validate/qualify any change in the design.  The 
supply system retains support of the afterbody to this day, but it became the program’s 
responsibility to support the forebody. 
It was during this phase of torpedo production that modification kits instead of AURs 
were procured.  The combination of AR requirements, kit procurement, and hardware 
complexities began to have an impact on forebody spares availability, as well as how spares 
could be procured.  The HWT production contracts had transitioned from a technical “risk 
avoidance” construct based on the use of a proven detailed TDP that could be built by many 
qualified vendors to a “risk management” construct based on high level performance 
specifications.  This transition requires vigilant management to avoid problems.  Under AR 
the Navy cannot tell the vendor how to build the item being procured; it can only define the 
item’s performance and interface requirements.  Since each vendor has the latitude to build 
the end item in a different manner, the risk of compatibility within the system as well as 
across systems became more complex and presents a number of challenges related to 
production and logistics. 
The Supply System Construct  
Supply support for the HWT program has been provided by the Navy Supply 
(NAVSUP) system.  The Navy Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) manages supply support 
for what is referred to as Depot Level Repairables (DLR) (i.e., unique torpedo items) and the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages supply support for consumable items.  For the 
HWT, NAVICP (Mechanicsburg, PA) is the Program Support Inventory Control Point 






Engineering Agent and initiate the provisioning process for the required items.  The PSICP 
assigns National Stock Numbers (NSN) to the items and updates the COSALs for the 
various Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA).  This supply system construct is depicted 
in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Torpedo Supply Chain Construct 
Supply system stocking levels are forecasted based on past demand.  A rolling 
average for the demand from the past eight quarters is used to trigger procurement or 
repairs.  Procurement lead times are adversely impacted by diminishing manufacturing 
sources, obsolescence, rejected deliverables, and contract defaults.  At times, the program 
must directly compensate for these deficiencies in availability by making their own 
procurements.  Demand for items filled from outside the supply system (i.e., procurements 
made by the program) is provided to the PSICP via an unfunded “Demand Requisition Only” 
document, so this data may be factored into overall demand for the item.  Attempts have 
been made to utilize alternative methods to forecast future demand such as “anticipated 
workload.”  These types of forecasts can be submitted using “Special Program 
Requirements” (SPR) to NAVICP and “Demand Data Exchange” (DDE) to DLA.  It has 
proven difficult to identify long term workload requirements and fluctuations, and as a result 
the program has had limited success using these methodologies.  Another attempt to 
compensate for extensive procurement lead times was the establishment of a program-
funded Centralized Logistics Support (CLS) in 2005.  The idea was to improve parts 
availability utilizing central procurement and management for all IMAs.  This organization’s 
charter was to overcome shortages and improve availability at the IMAs.  CLS was 
disbanded in 2009 as it was deemed too costly.  In parallel with CLS efforts, the enterprise 
attempted various methods to contract with the prime HWT OEM to provide total commercial 
supply support responsibility for the HWT program without success; the Request for 
Proposal (RFP) was never issued.   
For support of the major FIR hardware items, which are still being produced (CBASS 
kits), there exists Contract Line Item Numbers (CLIN) on the production contract to buy 
spare FIRs and repair FIRs.  At this time, the quantity of spares procured is based on known 
failure rates (calculated by the Government) and limited by the available spares budget.  
The repair CLINs have a small amount of funding available for a “pay-as-you-go,” best effort 
type arrangement with very few requirements and no contractual obligation.  The contractor 
is not responsible to repair the item if he encounters obsolescence issues.  As a result, 
availability suffers as spares are consumed and/or when failure rates exceed anticipated 
levels. 
As the follow-on production contract was being established, a supportability CLIN 
was proposed, which would have implemented a PBL-like methodology that established a 
FIR availability requirement at the IMA as the contractor’s responsibility.  The contractor 
would negotiate a firm fixed price to provide a defined percentage of availability for the FIRs 
he produces over a given performance period.  This CLIN was not added to the RFP due to 
the perception that it was not affordable, and that it might limit competition.  As a result, the 
enterprise decided to continue with the established methodology of procuring spares on the 
production contract in conjunction with repair CLINs.  
Several recent papers have highlighted the reluctance of Program Managers to 
implement the PBL construct within the DoD.  In Fowler (2009), a comparison is made 
between performance-based logistics (also called performance-based life cycle product 
support) and the fictional superhero Batman.  Like Batman, PBL has received a poor 





critics of “contracting out” logistical support through the use of a Product-Support Integrator 
(PSI).  The author points out that the PSI only integrates the product support, and does not 
eliminate the need for logistical services within the DoD.  He further points out that the PSI 
does not have to be the OEM but can be either a government or industry entity.  However, 
because in most cases the OEM is the PSI, the misconception has developed that the PSI 
must be the OEM.  The author also provides figures showing recent cost and time savings 
within the DoD, which can be directly attributed to a program’s use of PBL strategies.  
Kim, Cohen and Netessine (2007) also recognize the difficulties encountered when 
seeking to implement PBL contracts.  This paper provides guidance with respect to what 
type of contract should be used in certain contractual situations.  In this paper, the authors 
present a PBL strategy of purchasing the “results of a product” as opposed to buying the 
actual repair parts, spares, and maintenance activities.  Due to its success in the private 
sector, PBL was implemented in the DoD as the preferred method for purchasing product 
life cycle support.  The PBL approach does not specify how a contractor must support the 
product, only the required level of support.  However, very few contractors have embraced 
PBL, and the Government Accountability Office stated that savings related to the 
implementation of PBL could not be demonstrated.  With this background, the authors seek 
to show how a PBL-type contract can be successfully executed based on the participants’ 
risk strategies.  The authors also seek to show which type of contract (fixed-price, cost-plus, 
or PBL) or combination of contracts is best suited for certain contractual settings.  Their 
results show that if a contractor’s decisions are able to be observed and defined, a fixed-
price/cost-plus contract is preferable.  However, if the contractor’s services are 
unobservable and all parties are risk neutral, a fixed-price contract with PBL incentives is 
best.  Lastly, the authors determine that if any of the parties is risk averse, an optimal 
contract cannot be executed.  In this case, the best contract combines elements of each of 
the evaluated contract types.  The models used in this paper to analyze the different 
contracting environments are an inventory allocation model and the moral hazard model. 
The importance of optimizing how we buy and implement supportability is a vital part 
of the acquisition process.  Critical factors impacting procurement of supportability are 
limited funding from disparate sources coupled with an uncertain time frame in which the 
OEM is available to provide the spares/repair capability associated with modern torpedoes 
and for which the OEM holds the product design and repair know-how.  As a result, it is 
more important than ever to implement a sound methodology that can quickly and 
accurately address our spares requirements.  The following section compares and contrasts 
PBL versus traditional life cycle support. 
Pay Me Now, Pay Me Later 
When considering the trade-offs between the performance-based contracting 
approach (pay me now) and the standard contracting approach (pay me later), it is important 
to analyze several factors associated with the product or system to be acquired.  These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the overall life-cycle cost, the expected future service 
and spares’ costs, the acquisition’s complexity, and the life-cycle length. 
In the standard approach to contract writing, services and spares are purchased 
post-production as needed.  This offers several distinct advantages and disadvantages.  
Because the costs for future services and parts are not added into the contract’s overall 
cost, the starting contract cost is reduced.  This in turn lowers the budget allocated to the 
contract, and allows the unused money to be used for other program needs.  However, even 





expected to be purchased as needed in the future.  This can cause several problems for the 
customer.  First, in the case of products with a long life cycle (let us assume a life cycle 
greater than 10 years), if replacement parts or spares are needed for the product after 
manufacturing has ended, the customer has limited (and often expensive) options for 
obtaining the needed parts.  The customer could approach the original contractor about 
restarting production, which is likely to be more expensive than the original production cost.  
This is because the part may be obsolete at this point and unable to be sold or used for any 
purpose other than as a spare.  The customer could also approach a new contractor about 
recreating the original part.  This approach can face problems due to lack of know-how, 
incomplete documentation on the original part, and testing time and money needed to 
integrate the new part into the original system.  The last option would be to design an 
entirely new part, which could boost the functionality of the system but would most likely be 
time consuming and expensive to build and test. 
In the PBL approach, spares and services based on a performance measure are 
purchased up-front and included in the cost of the production contract.  This approach also 
has several advantages and disadvantages.  The main hurdle to this approach is the early 
planning to reprogram out-year supportability funding into the current contract year (aka 
transition year).  The transition year necessitates auxiliary funding to pay for the PBL CLIN.  
This contributes to a perceived increase in the overall contract cost at contract inception.  If 
the negotiated costs associated with the PBL CLIN were equal to or less than the cost of 
spares, there would be no increased cost to the enterprise.  Purchasing services and spares 
based on a performance measure, such as operational availability, can save money in the 
long term.  The source of auxiliary funding could be the funding currently used to procure 
spares; this also requires reprogramming money intended for hardware spares procurement 
to purchase “supportability” services.  An additional challenge for the TE is the inconsistency 
between the production contract period of performance and torpedo life-cycle.  The 
production contract has a period of performance of six years (i.e., one base year, four option 
years, one warranty year), whereas the torpedo’s life-cycle is 25 to 40 years (although its 
maintenance due date is significantly less than that).  If a contractor is obligated to support 
and provide a system’s spares for the full life cycle, the disadvantages for the standard 
contracting approach become the advantages of the PBL approach.  The money (and 
perhaps the time) that would have to be spent in the future is eliminated.  It becomes the 
contractor’s responsibility to determine how the system will be supported.  The contractor 
can manufacture a large surplus of spares and stock-pile them for the future, maintain (or 
mothball) a small production line to satisfy future demand, and/or build a highly reliable 
product that minimizes (or eliminates) the need for the first two options. 
In conclusion, when determining which contracting method to employ, it is important 
to determine the complexity, life-cycle length, and expected costs associated with the 
product being acquired.  Simple products that should not require extensive or unique 
sparing and servicing in the future might be better suited to the standard approach.  
Likewise, short life cycle products that are not expected to outlive the manufacturing 
processes producing them might also be better suited to the standard approach.  However, 
complex and extended life cycle products would most likely be better supported and 
maintained using a PBL contract.  The final factor when determining which contract to use is 
the expected life cycle cost of the system.  If the future costs for sparing and services of the 
system are expected to exceed the extra cost associated with a PBL contract, then a PBL 
contract should be used.  Cost estimates need to consider the future cost of money in this 
process.  After deciding to utilize the PBL contract methodology, contract requirements in 





A Short Discussion of Common Inventory Metrics 
To better understand the status of an inventory’s current state and level of 
effectiveness, an abbreviated list of relevant and commonly used inventory metrics are 
identified below.  The metrics selected (DAU, 2010) are separated into two categories: 
“Enterprise” and “Source.”  Enterprise metrics measure the variables determined by the 
customer, while Source metrics measure the variables determined by the contractor. 
First we will discuss the Enterprise inventory metrics.  These include: 
 Inventory turns, 
 Perfect order fulfillment rate, 
 Supply chain response time, and 
 Weapon non-mission-capable (NMC) rate. 
The inventory turns metric measures how much inventory is being used compared to 
the amount of inventory that is on hand (average) over a certain time period.  It can be 
defined as how much of a certain measure of inventory (i.e., monetary worth, amount, or 
number of assemblies) is removed from the inventory divided by the average of that 
measure over the time period being analyzed.  In the case of the HWT spares inventory 
being discussed, the spares stored are used to replace parts (FIRs) internal to the product 
(HWTs).  For this reason, the optimal value for the spares inventory turns metric is zero, 
which correlates to an organization that never needs to replace parts internal to its products. 
Perfect order fulfillment rate, when related to the organization’s inventory, is defined 
as the ratio of perfectly satisfied orders and total orders filled from the organization’s 
inventory.  A perfectly satisfied order is defined as an order delivered with all of the ordered 
parts in perfect condition, on time and with all of the necessary documentation. 
The supply chain response time of an enterprise is defined as the average amount of 
time it takes from recognizing the need for a certain part to the time the part arrives at the 
organization and is ready for use.  This metric can be broken down into more discrete 
segments such as the time it takes to plan an order, the time it takes to source the part, and 
the amount of time it takes for the part to be delivered to the organization. 
The metric referred to as the weapon Non-Mission-Capable (NMC) rate is the ratio of 
weapons in the fleet that cannot be used to complete their specified mission and the total 
amount of weapons in the fleet.  This is a very important metric for the TE because it helps 
define the mission readiness of the larger submarine enterprise.  If the submarine’s primary 
weapon is not mission ready at an acceptable rate, then the mission readiness of the 
submarine will be greatly decreased and therefore the mission readiness of the Navy will be 
adversely impacted. 
We will now proceed to discuss some common Source inventory metrics.  The 
following metrics are mostly concerned with the quality of the delivered order and the time it 
takes for an order to be delivered.  They are: 
 Percent of perfect order fulfillment,  
 Percent of correct quantity deliveries,  
 Percent of defect-free deliveries, 





 Percent of on-time deliveries, 
 Total source lead-time, 
 Handling lead times, 
 Receiving lead time, and 
 Supplier lead time. 
Percent of perfect order fulfillment if shown in a Venn diagram would be the unity of 
the percent of correct quantity deliveries, percent of defect-free deliveries, percent of 
deliveries with correct documentation, and percent of on-time deliveries metrics.  These 
metrics are relatively straight forward to measure and are self defining.  The importance of 
the percent of perfect order fulfillment is that it gives a high-level view of the a contractor’s 
actual order fulfillment capability, while the metrics that make up a perfect order are more 
granular and point to actual problems the contractor might be experiencing in their order 
filling process.  These insights can then lead to correction strategies for these problems. 
The metric total source lead time is very similar to the Enterprise metric supply chain 
response time, except that this lead time is calculated from the contractor’s point of view.  
Total source lead time can be viewed as the amount of contractor time elapsed, from the 
time they become aware of an order being placed to the time that order becomes available 
to the customer.  This is equal to the supply chain response time minus the time it takes for 
the customer to recognize its need to order a part and the order being placed. 
Handling lead time refers to the amount of time it takes from receipt of a shipment 
until the individual parts are put in their first official storage positions at the customer’s 
facility.  In the case of an order of office supplies, this lead time would be the amount of time 
elapsed between the shipment being recognized as arriving at the office and the supplies 
being placed in the supply buffer area. 
Receiving lead time is slightly different than handling lead time.  Receiving lead time 
is the time immediately before handling lead time.  Receiving lead time is the amount of time 
that elapses between delivery to the customer’s facility and the time when the ordering 
facility recognizes the shipment as being received.  Using the office supplies example again, 
let’s suppose that the shipment were delivered to the office building after hours and the box 
was first found by the secretary the next morning.  The time between delivery and the 
secretary finding the box would be the receiving lead time.  
Supplier lead time is defined as the amount of time it takes from order confirmation to 
the time the order arrives at the ordering facility.  Again using the office supplies example, if 
the secretary ordered the office supplies online, this would be the amount of time from when 
the secretary received the order confirmation e-mail to the time the shipment was left at the 
office building by the delivery company. 
Several other metrics commonly associated with inventories are: 
 System Reliability, 
 Product Reliability, 
 Operational Availability, 
 Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), 





 Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT), 
 Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT), and 
 Mean Accumulated Down Time (MADT). 
System reliability refers to the ability of a system to achieve its specified goals and is 
measured as a percentage value.  For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that a 
system is comprised of many products.  In our case, the system we are considering is the 
torpedo and the products are the FIRs.  The torpedo’s reliability can be calculated by 
dividing the number of in-water runs in which there are no failures by the total number of in-
water runs.  It is important to remember that torpedo reliability is determined by the reliability 
of the torpedo components. 
Product reliability is calculated by dividing, at the FIR level, the number of times a 
product performs its task correctly by the number of times the product is asked to perform its 
specified task.  As stated in the previous paragraph, product reliability determines system 
reliability.  Therefore, system reliability cannot be greater than product reliability. 
Operational Availability (Ao) is determined by a number of factors, including system 
reliability.  Operational availability is defined as the percentage of time that a group of 
products or systems is available to be used for its intended purpose or the percentage of the 
group’s up-time. 
Mean time to repair is the expected amount of time it takes from the time a product 
or system fails until that product or system is available for use again. 
Mean time to failure is the expected amount of time a product is available for use 
after a repair or purchase until the product or system experiences its next major (or 
debilitating) failure. 
Mean logistics delay time is the sum of the two logistical activities at the beginning 
and end of the mean time to repair metric.  The first logistical activity is the amount of time 
from when the product or system fails to the time it arrives at the repair facility and is 
available for the needed reparatory action.  The second logistical activity is the amount of 
time it takes from the time the repair is completed to the time the product or system is again 
able to be used by the product’s (or system’s) owner. 
Mean supply response time is the expected amount of time it takes for a product’s or 
system’s supply system to respond to, repair or replace, and return the working 
product/system to the user.  
Mean accumulated down time is the time that a group of systems or products is not 
operational and can be seen as an inverse metric to operational availability. 
Metrics are Not a Two-way Street 
The relationship between the metrics is illustrated in Table 1.  When viewing Table 1 
please note that while the metrics on the horizontal X- and vertical Y-axis are the same, the 
variables on the X-axis are the independent variables and the variables on the Y-axis are 
the dependent variables.  This means that while variable “a” might influence variable “b,” 






This can be understood in Table 1 by considering the metrics “system reliability” and 
“product reliability” with the assumption that multiple products make up a system.  In this 
case, the reliability of the individual products influences the reliability of the system.  
However, the system’s reliability does not influence the individual products’ reliabilities. 
Table 1.  

















































































































































































































































































































































% of Correct Quantity 
Deliveries 
00% 
% of Defect-Free 
Deliveries 
00% 
% Deliveries with 
Correct Documentation 
00% 






Handling Lead Times 
Receiving Lead Time 
Supplier Lead Time 
00% System Reliability 
00% Product Reliability 
00% Operational Availability 
Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR) 
Mean Time To Failure 
(MTTF) 
Mean Logistics Delay 
Time (MLDT) 

















As shown in this matrix, the “availability” metric is affected by many of the other 
metrics and may serve as a good indicator of the contractor’s performance on a PBL 
contract. 
Newsvendor-based Approaches for Designing PBL Contracts 
The newsvendor problem is a single period mathematical model used to determine 
optimal inventory levels when the demand is uncertain (Porteus, 1991).  The model 
assumes that a decision to procure a certain number of items (Q) is made at the start of a 
period. Subsequently, the random demand (D) for the item is revealed.  The distribution of D 
is assumed to be F(D), with a mean μ.  An ordering/restocking cost of C is charged per unit.  
If the number of items procured exceeds the realized demand, a per unit effective disposal 
cost of CH is charged for the period.  However, if the demand exceeds the amount procured, 
a per unit shortage cost of CP is assessed for the period.  An assumption is made that F(x) = 
0 for x < 0.  In this scenario, the cost function for one period is: 
 




Here, F-1 is the inverse of the distribution function.  The quantity (CP – C)/(CP + CH) is 
the critical fractile and is the optimal probability of not stocking out (Porteus, 1991). 
The newsvendor problem has been used as a starting point for analyzing many 
scenarios.  A review of some extensions can be found in Khouja (1999). Among the cases 
that can be related to the analysis of contractor performance are Dada, Petruzzi, and 
Schwarz (2006); Bensoussan, Feng, and Sethi (2004); Kim et al. (2007); and others.  In 
Dada et al., a newsvendor model is used to structure a scenario when a single newsvendor 
is served by several suppliers, some or all of whom may be unreliable. This can be used for 
modeling operations in PBL when several vendors are contracted to maintain a supply of 
either weapon assemblies or subsystems (FIRS).  In Bensoussan (2004), a vendor commits 
to an initial purchase, following which some estimate of the demand is revealed.  Additional 
purchases can be made for a higher cost, subsequent to which the final demand is realized.  
An overall service constraint is also satisfied in determining the solutions to the two stages 
for ordering.   In the context of PBL, each stage can represent the ordering decision at the 
IMA and the manufacturing facility for the vendor, while the service constraint can guarantee 
the availability.  However, as noted by the authors, when there is private forecast 
information, the mechanism for coordination of the fleet and vendor’s decisions remains to 
be determined.   
As mentioned earlier, Kim et al. (2007) evaluated PBL as a strategy for purchasing 
the “results of a product” as opposed to buying the actual repair parts, spares and 
maintenance activities. One of the significant factors identified by the authors when 
designing incentives for PBL is the observability of contractor performance and the tolerance 





In Kang, Doerr, and Sanchez (2006), it was noted that PBL specifies outcomes, not 
numbers of spare parts or hours of maintenance.  The emphasis of the contract is on 
metrics to be achieved by the contractor (in this paper the metrics are operational availability 
and readiness risk) not the way in which the contractor must achieve the specified metrics.  
The authors use a simulation to show which alternatives customers should specify to 
increase operational availability and reduce readiness risk.  Their simulation then helps 
estimate which alternatives will best improve the specified metrics for a given contractual 
environment.  The model shows that transportation/administrative delay is a main 
determining factor for operational availability, whereas number of spares on the shelf is not.  
In the context of torpedo production, under PBL contracts, the interaction between 

















Figure 2. Contractor’s Role in the Spares Support Process 
The COSAL is the safety stock, and the random demand is generated by fleet usage.  
The cost of understocking is the total time spent by the IMA waiting for a particular FIR.  The 
cost of overstocking can be assumed to be related to the average amount that it costs a 
single FIR to be shipped and the cost of managing and maintaining the inventory.  Typically, 
the overstocking cost is low relative to the understocking cost, which implies that the vendor 
will have an incentive to maintain a large shelf inventory.  However, in the context of PBL, 
the contractor must incentivize lower inventory levels so that the ultimate thrust is on 
reducing the need for an inventory (i.e. reducing the number of failures during fleet usage). 
Simulation-Based Models of PBL Operations 
Based on the discussion above, the following protocol for operating a PBL has been 







IMA. The maximum number of FIRs is specified in the COSAL for each IMA, and 
modifications to the COSAL to meet the required availability can be negotiated as part of 
this contract. When an incoming torpedo needs a replacement FIR, the inventory status of 
the FIR is determined by the current availability number in the system (a).  If a is zero or 
negative, a request for immediate replenishment will be issued to the contractor. If a is 
positive, the spare FIR is removed from the container and issued to the IMA floor.  The failed 
FIR is placed in the empty container and returned to the contractor.  The contractor has 
visibility into the inventory level at each IMA at all times. 
Clearly, the COSAL should relate to the failure level of a FIR.  If the FIR never fails in 
service, then the corresponding COSAL value can be set to zero.  However, since a zero 
failure rate is unlikely to be achieved, the COSAL must be set to some positive value.  
Based on analytical and simulation models and using specified reliability numbers for the 
FIRs, appropriate COSAL levels can be determined that will achieve desired supportability 
levels.   If the contractor cannot meet availability numbers using the COSAL levels in the 
contract, this is an indicator that the reliability for the FIR has slipped below the expected 
reliability, and appropriate action must be taken to address this.   
The following measure of performance has been developed for availability for an 
initial analysis: 
Availability =  
The performance of this measure is a function of the failure rate, the stock level on 
shelf, and the variation in failure rates.  Based on a hypothetical usage rate in excess of five 
hundred per year, Table 2, below, shows the results of a simulation exploring the 
relationship between the failure rate, the variation in failure rate (which would also represent 
the variation in the demand or number of torpedoes needed per week), and the COSAL 
values. 
Table 2. Simulation Results for Evaluating Interaction of COSAL and 
Failure Rates 
Availability 
(OPTEMPO = above 500 per year, Logistic Delay = 1 week) 
  Failure Rate Variation 
FIR 
Failure 
Rate 25% 50% 75% 100% 
↓ Common Shipboard Allowance Level (COSAL) 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
0.05 96.1% 100.0% 100.0% 96.1% 100.0% 100.0% 87.9% 100.0% 100.0% 76.5% 100.0% 100.0%
0.06 89.7% 100.0% 100.0% 83.9% 100.0% 100.0% 74.3% 100.0% 100.0% 65.8% 100.0% 100.0%
0.07 73.2% 100.0% 100.0% 67.5% 100.0% 100.0% 63.4% 97.8% 100.0% 57.1% 95.7% 100.0%
0.08 63.4% 100.0% 100.0% 59.1% 97.9% 100.0% 54.2% 96.0% 100.0% 48.1% 88.3% 100.0%
0.09 56.5% 100.0% 100.0% 51.5% 97.0% 100.0% 46.4% 94.4% 100.0% 43.7% 85.0% 99.2%





0.11 47.7% 93.6% 100.0% 41.3% 85.2% 100.0% 40.3% 74.5% 99.3% 35.4% 71.7% 94.6%
0.12 40.9% 86.7% 100.0% 38.5% 77.6% 100.0% 35.4% 70.7% 97.3% 32.7% 65.8% 92.0%
0.13 38.8% 78.8% 100.0% 35.9% 69.8% 98.6% 32.7% 64.6% 93.7% 30.6% 61.5% 88.9%
0.14 36.9% 73.8% 100.0% 34.2% 65.0% 95.5% 30.4% 62.3% 88.8% 27.7% 55.6% 82.0%
0.15 33.5% 70.3% 98.7% 30.4% 62.7% 90.1% 28.4% 58.1% 84.2% 26.1% 52.0% 78.3%
The entries in the table are the average (over 1,000 runs) of the Availability metric for 
a given failure rate (row label), and a random variation (for now, uniformly distributed–
column group header) and different COSAL levels.  This simulation, implemented in a 
spreadsheet, verifies that as failure rates drop, the COSAL required to support fleet 
operations is smaller.  The entries in this sheet could have been computed using a 
newsvendor approach directly—this did not require simulation.  However, the actual nature 
of variation is somewhat more complicated.  The simulation is designed to take variations in 
exercise rates typically encountered throughout the year and changes in the logistic delay to 
determine the optimal COSAL required to support the fleet.  Furthermore, this simulation can 
also be used when negotiating with the contractors prior to the award of contract to 
determine what the contractors’ estimates of their own failure rates are and to work with 
them to set mutually satisfactory expectations. 
As mentioned in Kang et al. (2006), the transportation delay correlates most 
significantly with the operational availability. This is also borne out by the simulations 
performed above.  Because of this, the responsibility for delivery to the shelf is best 
delegated to the contractor in a PBL setting. 
An extension of this simulation allows an optimization of the COSAL required to 
achieve a given service level.  This is not dissimilar to the approaches developed in 
Schneider (1978) and Shang and Song (2004), but the advantage of the 
simulation/optimization is that it dispenses with the assumptions of independence of failure 
rates that are often necessary for analytical solutions and the distributional assumptions that 
go along as well. 
Conclusion 
This paper discusses the application of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
contracts for supporting the Torpedo Enterprise. Several performance measures commonly 
used in PBL contracts are described, and a model is presented that uses an “availability” 
metric for observing and measuring contractor performance.  This metric is calculated using 
the number of times a required part is not available to field maintenance sites.  Terms of the 
contract are not specified with regard to lead times such as logistical delays and 
manufacturing and restocking lags.  These times are assumed to be under the contractor’s 
control, as are production quantities, quality, and responsiveness.  A newsvendor approach 
for determining optimal shelf inventory levels is developed.  An augmented model is 
evaluated using a simulation to determine the performance sensitivity to changes in product 
quality, demand rates, and various supply chain-related lead times.  Practical collateral 
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